[svn.haxx.se] · SVN Dev · SVN Users · SVN Org · TSVN Dev · TSVN Users · Subclipse Dev · Subclipse Users · this month's index

Re: Credentials held unencrypted in memory during runtime

From: Ron Wilson <ronw.mrmx_at_gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2011 11:41:28 -0400

On Tue, Apr 12, 2011 at 10:54 AM, Stefan Küng <tortoisesvn_at_gmail.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 12, 2011 at 16:50, Ron Wilson <ronw.mrmx_at_gmail.com> wrote:
>> If this is truly the case, then SVN is not implemted correctly.
>> However, that would be for a different mail list.
>
> So, how should it be implemented?

I will assume the algorithm used is strong. Therefore the main sources
of weakness would be a fixed key, poor key generation, poor handling
of the key or mistakes in implementation.

The last 2 can mitigated by design and code reviews, preferably by
outside experts. Every bit of security code my coworkers and I write
is reviewed by experts whose billing rates far exceed my pay+benefits.

Key generation techniques depend on the soures of entropy available.
While the software I help develop is targetted to vastly different
platforms than a PC, I can say that potential sources of entropy on a
PC would include key press timing variations, disk access timing
variations and network statistics. The outputs of several sources of
entropy can be combined using a hash function like SHA.

But, as I said, this is really a discussion for a different mail list.

------------------------------------------------------
http://tortoisesvn.tigris.org/ds/viewMessage.do?dsForumId=4061&dsMessageId=2719127

To unsubscribe from this discussion, e-mail: [users-unsubscribe_at_tortoisesvn.tigris.org].
Received on 2011-04-12 17:41:35 CEST

This is an archived mail posted to the TortoiseSVN Users mailing list.

This site is subject to the Apache Privacy Policy and the Apache Public Forum Archive Policy.