stsp_at_apache.org wrote on Fri, 18 Aug 2017 10:33 +0000:
> +++ subversion/site/publish/security/CVE-2017-9800-advisory.txt Fri Aug 18 10:33:10 2017
> @@ -80,24 +96,36 @@ Recommendations:
> the included patch.
> 3. Clients that are not able to execute the 'ssh' command are not vulnerable.
> + If the value of this option is set to a non-existent path, then svn+ssh://
> + URLs will no longer work but the svn client will not be vulnerable:
> + ssh = /this/path/does/not/exist
This workaround does not work if --config-option is passed on the command line.
I think it is not unusual to invoke svn(1) through a wrapper that always sets
some options. (In this specific case, someone might have an alias to svn that
sets config:tunnels:ssh differently depending on what jumphost they need to use.)
I think the advisory should be complete, i.e., cover every supported use-case,
so it can be used as a checklist that users go through, and once they have done
so they can be sure that they are no longer vulnerable. That said, I do agree
that a shortened version that covers only the most common use-cases would be a
Good Thing as well.
Here's suggested text for the former; the latter can be addressed in follow-up
--- CVE-2017-9800-advisory.txt (revision 1805448)
+++ CVE-2017-9800-advisory.txt (working copy)
@@ -107,6 +107,9 @@
If the value of this option is set to a non-existent path, then svn+ssh://
URLs will no longer work but the svn client will not be vulnerable:
ssh = /this/path/does/not/exist
+ This trick WILL NOT WORK if the option setting is overridden by the
+ --config-option=config:tunnels:ssh=foo command-line option of the
+ command-line client.
However, if OpenSSH is used as SSH client (the default on most UNIX-like
systems), then svn+ssh:// URLs can still be used safely. Either change the
--- CVE-2017-9800-advisory.txt.asc (revision 1805448)
+++ CVE-2017-9800-advisory.txt.asc (working copy)
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+Comment: TODO: re-sign
Received on 2017-08-18 19:33:20 CEST