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Re: Changeset Signing

From: Ruchir Arya <ruchirarya_at_gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2015 12:56:16 -0700 (PDT)

Hi Brane,

Since last few days i am going through the document to implement changeset
signing. The link is given below:
In this document, i don't understand what is the meaning of the statement
given below.
"the client could silently retry the txn-commit if HEAD changed from the
time when the commit txn was created."
How can a client silently retry the transaction-commit or zombie
transaction? Which command can be used to do that?
Additionally, can changeset signing be applied to SVN the way it has been
proposed in this document?

-Ruchir Arya

On Monday, June 8, 2015 at 4:11:27 AM UTC-4, Branko Čibej wrote:
> On 08.06.2015 04:19, Ruchir Arya wrote:
> > Hello everybody,
> >
> > I am new to SVN development. I have a question. Why is there no
> > implementation of changeset signing in subversion? Suppose if the
> > root/admin (who maintains repository) is not trustworthy,
> If your server administrator is not trustworthy, then no amount of
> signing is going to help. Anyone with direct access to the repository
> storage (which a server admin will have) can modify revision contents
> even if they're signed; no cryptographic signature is proof against
> attack.
> > then there is a problem. Is there any future possibility to implement
> > digital signing of changeset to achieve integrity and non repudiation?
> > My focus is to implement some of the security related features in svn.
> Subversion's repository backend already goes a good way towards ensuring
> integrity: the client provides cryptographic hashes of all committed
> data and the server checks them before committing, and the reverse
> happens during checkout/update. The server also stores hashes for
> certain metadata (although not all; there's room for improvement here).
> Non-repudiation is a lot harder to achieve because it's not enough to
> control the server, you also have to prove that every client making
> commits is free from malicious software that could be inserting
> backdoors at the source of the commit.
> -- Brane
Received on 2015-08-03 21:56:24 CEST

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