On Sat, May 11, 2013 at 01:28:26PM +0300, Daniel Shahaf wrote:
> Stefan Sperling wrote on Tue, Mar 05, 2013 at 14:24:32 +0100:
> > If the temp file is within a system-wide temp dir, and we end up expanding
> When exactly is that going to happen? You call svn_stream_open_unique()
> with dirpath != NULL, so the tempdir it will use is ./ (neither /tmp or
It's not going to live in the system tempdir in the case under discussion.
My point was that I would not like the code to be reused in a context
where the file could end up in /tmp (where dirpath is a system tempdir).
We could add a comment to explain the problem -- then I would be fine
with any approach that works.
> > in which case this doesn't really matter. If the working copy contains
> > secrets it had better be within a directory that untrusted users cannot
> > access. But I think the code should at least set a good example.
> So, can someone explain to me what the "other" race condition is? The
> current code is racy because DST_TMP has (0777 &~ umask) perms while it
> is being written to.
DST_TMP has more restrictive permissions than that. It is created with
the mkstemp() function under the hood. So we can assume that the perms
of DST_TMP are configured such that only the user running svn can access
the file. So we always start off with something like 600 on DST_TMP.
And we need to preserve the permission bits of the existing DST
(whatever they are) when renaming DST_TMP on top of it.
Received on 2013-05-11 13:32:43 CEST