Peter Samuelson wrote:
> [Jon Foster]
>> All he has to do is change the svn:sync-from-url property on the
>> mirror repository to be a file:// URL to the source repository,
>> rather than a http:// one. The correct file:// URL is probably
>> guessable.
>
> I'd never thought of this as as security problem, but I _do_ think it's
> a suboptimal design where a svnsync setup stores state on the mirrored
> repository which is relative not to the mirror, but to whoever is
> running svnsync.
>
>> Please can we change "svnsync sync" to allow both the source and
>> target URLs to be specified? That rather simple measure would block
>> this attack. Since svnsync is usually invoked from a script, typing
>> the extra URL isn't a problem.
>
> Yes, this sounds like a good design anyway, aside from the security
> question.
I'm coding right now along these lines.
--
C. Michael Pilato <cmpilato_at_collab.net>
CollabNet <> www.collab.net <> Distributed Development On Demand
Received on 2010-05-12 18:09:18 CEST