it would also be nice to have an api to change the permissions. These could be added to the classes that implement the retrieving/storing of authorization-data (I mentionned them earlier.). I suppose that there could be a general security-interface to the different (types of) data in a repository (directory, file, property, ...) that also describes what security-settings can be applied to them. This interface should then be implemented by the classes that store the security-settings.
There could be permissions who is allowed to change the permissions ...
I know that this is recursive, which might be handy ... I'll leave it open for a moment.
Op dinsdag 19 september 2006 23:12, schreef Michel Brabants:
> a little, but important correction.
> Op dinsdag 19 september 2006 23:07, schreef Michel Brabants:
> > Hello,
> > I'm nto sure if I'll have a look ath the patch because I wouldn't like the
> > maintenance-time it could cost me. Maybe I'll have a look ...
> > Let's see how I would design it ... :)
> > Op dinsdag 19 september 2006 20:51, schreef Lieven Govaerts:
> > > email@example.com wrote:
> > > > Hello,
> > > >
> > > > I checked on roadmap-site of subversiona nd can't seem to find any plans
> > > > to provide a kind of plugin-system to provide additional methods of
> > > > authorization . This is a point in which subversion is lacking to my
> > > > opinion. I could use apache to direct this, but I don't find this a good
> > > > solution. If I would use apache to limit access, those permissions
> > > > wouldn't be applied when ssh+svn would be used (which isn't the case).
> > > > However, we use trac, which also only shows the content that a user may
> > > > view, based on the authz-file. So, using apache for authorization would
> > > > allow users to view the content through the trac-browse-feature.
> > > > I could synchronize the files manually or using hooks to update the
> > > > authz-file, but I'm not sure if that covers everything (have to check) and
> > > > a plugin-system of a direct ldap-implentation would be better.
> > > >
> > > > So, are there any plans to implement ldap-authorization and is there a
> > > > planning?
> > > >
> > > This has been discussed before, but there's no real set of requirements
> > > let alone a design of how that will look like. Feel free to step in :)
> > >
> > Maybe an important note: I'm not so familiar with the code of the
> > subversion-system.
> > Ok, this is a quick try ...
> > * Requirements:
> > It has to define who can access which data in the subversion-system.
> > * Which are the different types of data in the subversion-system, are there
> > dependencies between them and what type of data do they expose?
> > types of data:
> > 1) versionned data -> versionned files, directories and the relationships
> > between them.
> > 2) subversion-properties that are part of a particular version? For example:
> > log-data(?), bug-id, ...
> > I'll leave the dependencies a little bit open for the moment although it at
> > least partly mentionned above.
> > 1)
> > + So, to have full controll, one should have access-control on all data in a
> > change-set. Now, let's say that a file A appears in changesets 1,2 and 5. An
> > entity John has access to the file in changesets 1 and 5, but not in 2.
> > However, the patch for the file A in changeset 2 can be applied properly
> > without the changes in changeset 2.
> The latter sentence should be: However, the patch for the file A in changeset 5 can be applied properly without the changes in changeset 2.
> > What should one do? Maybe another entity
> > Jeffrey was adding information to the file 1 in changeset 2 that shouldn't be
> > disclosed to the entity John, so that is why John doesn has access to the
> > patch for file A in changeset 2. However, this means that the view of how the
> > patch for file 1 should look like after changeset 2 is different for John and
> > Jeffrey. The "worst" part is, that if there would be a conflict because of
> > John uploading a patch after changeset 2, John would have a difficult time
> > resolving the problem because he doesn't have access to the changes.
> > If you would do this in a "secure" way, one would encrypt each separate part
> > according to the persons who have access to the data. Maybe one could write
> > this down in a more formal way ... Maybe it helps. Ofcourse, the data could
> > appear unencrypter afterwards ... So, if one would apply restrictions on
> > already existing changesets ..., one can cause conflicts n the context of the
> > view that those restrictions create on the repository. One should be able to
> > see the conflicts it creates when the restrictions are applied ...
> > + Additional logic could be applied by saying that if a complete file/part(?)
> > is hidden completely from entity John in revision 7, that that file is also
> > hidden from John in revision 2 from then onwards. The file wasn't hidden from
> > the entity John in revision 2. Ofcourse, the entity John could already have
> > downloaded the file as it existed in revision 2.
> > 2) Log-data can apply to parts of code, ... With this I mean, that it could
> > reveal data concerning data that was hidden from the user. I'll stop here for
> > the moment ...
> > Maybe I went already further than what you meant, but I would like to have
> > versionned access-controll. Why? Let's say that I move a file, then the
> > restrictions of the "old" version should still be applied to the new one.
> > However, one can say that I'm already describing behavour that is not wanted
> > by everyone. This is true and I think that it doesn't matter in my above
> > explanation when security is applied to parts within changesets. One could
> > describe their own behaviour when the above explanation is applied (after
> > improvement maybe). Another example maybe. What when I have defined a
> > directory as a way of protecting my files and afterwards I move a file ...
> > This could actually be a wrong way of applying permissions. There should be a
> > permission of not be able to see/delete/... files. A directory is only the
> > groupation(?) of files. However, one could maybe define logic-rules that will
> > allow the method of "a directory protecting files" still to be secure.
> > This seem to be getting a security-implementation. This is actually true I
> > think :).
> > So, to conclude. When a person applies a patch, the repository should call an
> > api that shows restricts it to the context of the user. More specifcally, it
> > shows him the repository as the user would/should see it and then applies the
> > operation of the user. Ofcourse, there could be conflicts with views (of the
> > repository) of other users ...
> > Maybe there already exist theories about security for versionned data ... it
> > is actually not "more" I think than relationships between data which cause
> > the security-data to be applied to other data also.
> > Ok, I know that the authorization-information is not versionned now, but maybe
> > it would be interesting to version it like mentionned above.
> > ----------------------
> > Ofcourse the api ...
> > + getRepositoryView(entity) for getting the view on the repoitory. I don't
> > care if the security-information (what he may see) is available in a
> > text-file, in a database, an ldap-server of in which format it could exist.
> > If groups are also used, the groups that appear in the repository could be
> > fetched from an ldap-server. Ofcourse, there is information-exposure to the
> > ldap-server, but ok I'll leave it at this for now :).
> > getRepositoryView returns a repository-object which allows to browse the
> > repository as the user sees it. The repository-object contains files,
> > directories, properties and all the other (types of) data available in the
> > repository. One could implement the object that returns the view as a
> > different server (like it is maybe now), so that one could easily build a
> > (fuse-)filesystem or so on top of it ...
> > The object that returns the repository could implement a function
> > + getRepositoryView(DataRestrictions/DataAllowonce) (or an object that returns
> > this information)
> > The object that return the information could be a textreader for a specific
> > format, a class that reads the information from a database or an ldap-server.
> > These classes would define what type of information they need to define the
> > datarestrictions/allowances.
> > Explicitly allowing data could maybe usefull for avoiding mistakes ... Why
> > should denying it later overwrite allowing it earlier?
> > I hope that this information was usefull. Greetings,
> > Michel
> > > Some time ago there was a patch on the dev list which might or might not
> > > do what you want:
> > > http://svn.haxx.se/dev/archive-2006-07/0107.shtml
> > >
> > > Lieven.
> > >
Received on Tue Sep 19 23:43:57 2006
- application/pgp-signature attachment: stored