On Apr 6, 2012 2:06 AM, "Branko Čibej" <brane_at_apache.org> wrote:
>
> On 06.04.2012 00:38, C. Michael Pilato wrote:
> > I've been also frustrated when considering the situation that occurs
when a
> > user changes his/her master password, forcing a re-encryption of all
cached
> > credentials using the new password.
>
> You could do what whole-disk encryption systems do: only the encyprtion
> key is encrypted by the master passphrase, actual data are encrypted by
> that key. This allows different users with different passphrases to
> decrypt the same data, since they only decrypt a wrapped copy of the
> same encryption key.
>
> In other words, changing the master passphrase only requires decrypting
> and re-encrypting one 256-bit encryption key, not the whole credentials
> store.
PKBDF2 is in the current design to make dict attacks computationally
"impossible". Assuming we keep that, then the above value would be fed in
as the secret to PKBDF2, rather than MP or sha1(MP) ?
Cheers,
-g
Received on 2012-04-06 16:55:51 CEST