Re: cert caching touch-ups

Joe Orton wrote:

>To arrange the MITM, the attacker had placed a subjectAltName
>extension on the funkycode.org cert naming svn.webdav.org, and
>then subverts the DNS for svn.webdav.org to point to a server
>hosting trojaned neon code. Then when I "svn co" to make a new
>neon release, I get trojaned code without knowing it.
>
>
What I imagine needs to happen is that the funkycode.org cert
fingerprint needs to be cached only for funkycode.org; the name
specified by the cert is ignored, and that cached value is irrelevant
for any other name/port tuple.

I agree any sort of blind, global trust is a bad idea.

-David Waite

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Received on Tue Sep 23 01:46:03 2003